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Abstract
The clinical time-series setting poses a unique combination of challenges to data
modeling and sharing. Due to the high dimensionality of clinical time series, adequate
de-identification to preserve privacy while retaining data utility is difficult to achieve
using common de-identification techniques. An innovative approach to this problem is
synthetic data generation. From a technical perspective, a good generative model for
time-series data should preserve temporal dynamics, in the sense that new sequences
respect the original relationships between high-dimensional variables across time. From
the privacy perspective, the model should prevent patient re-identification by limiting
vulnerability to membership inference attacks. The NeurIPS 2020 Hide-and-Seek Privacy
Challenge is a novel two-tracked competition to simultaneously accelerate progress in
tackling both problems. In our head-to-head format, participants in the synthetic data
generation track (i.e. “hiders”) and the patient re-identification track (i.e. “seekers”) are
directly pitted against each other by way of a new, high-quality intensive care time-series
dataset: the AmsterdamUMCdb dataset. Ultimately, we seek to advance generative
techniques for dense and high-dimensional temporal data streams that are (1) clinically
meaningful in terms of fidelity and predictivity, as well as (2) capable of minimizing
membership privacy risks in terms of the concrete notion of patient re-identification.
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1 Competition Description
1.1 Background
Coupled with advances in machine learning, the vast quantities of clinical data now stored
in machine-readable form have the potential to revolutionize healthcare. At the same time,
this enterprise is threatened by the fact that patient data are inherently highly sensitive,
and privacy concerns have recently been thrown into sharp relief by several high-profile data
breaches that have greatly undermined public confidence (see e.g. Shah [2017], Price and
Cohen [2019]). We seek novel methods capable of bridging the gap between data-hungry
techniques in machine learning and privacy-conscious applications in healthcare settings.
Clinical Time-series. Central among this balancing act is the development of techniques
for modeling and sharing synthetic patient records in lieu of real data. However, the setting
of clinical time-series data poses a unique combination of challenges to data modeling and
sharing. Now, from a technical perspective, the learning problem in question is one of
synthetic data generation—a good generative model for time-series data should preserve
temporal dynamics, in the sense that new sequences respect the original relationships between
high-dimensional variables across time. Simultaneously from a social perspective, the privacy
problem in question is one of patient re-identification—a good generation technique should
have the effect of preserving membership privacy, in the sense that the algorithm limits
vulnerability of individual training instances to the risk of membership inference attacks.
(1) Time-series Generation. Purely from the standpoint of generative modeling, the
sequential setting of clinical time-series data already presents a distinctive learning challenge.
A model is not only tasked with capturing the distributions of patient features at each
point in time, but it should also adequately reflect the potentially complex evolution of
those variables over time. Existing methods directly apply the generative adversarial
network (GAN) framework to temporal data, primarily by instantiating recurrent neural
network (RNN) models as generators and discriminators (e.g. Esteban et al. [2017], Mogren
[2016], Ramponi et al. [2018]). Such straightforward approaches neglect to leverage the
autoregressive prior, and have been shown insufficient for ensuring that the network dynamics
efficiently capture stepwise dependencies in the original training data (Yoon et al. [2019]).
(2) Privacy and Identification. Perhaps more importantly, the question of synthetic data
generation cannot be divorced from concerns of privacy. While de-identified data are
commonly used for model development, existing notions of anonymity are often limited in
scope: k-anonymity, l-diversity, and τ -closeness are only aimed at protecting “sensitive” data
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(e.g. diagnoses) from an attack on a small number of quasi-identifiers (see Sweeney [2002],
Machanavajjhala et al. [2007] and Li et al. [2007] respectively), and differential privacy (see
Dwork et al. [2014]) has associated parameters that are difficult to interpret in terms of
well-understood notions of leakage—such as vulnerability to membership inference attacks.
In practice, the risk of patient re-identification is a pressing concern: Consider a rogue
insurance company discriminating against high-risk patients per financial incentive. Such
concerns caution medical institutions against releasing data for public research, hampering
progress in the validation of novel computational models for real-world clinical applications.
Hide-and-Seek Challenge. The NeurIPS 2020 Hide-and-Seek Privacy Challenge is a
novel two-tracked competition aiming to simultaneously accelerate progress in tackling both
problems. In our head-to-head format, participants in the synthetic data generation track
(i.e. “hiders”) and the patient re-identification track (i.e. “seekers”) are directly pitted against
each other: the latter submit methods for launching membership inference attacks, while the
former submit methods for synthesizing patient data that are robust to such attacks—all
while maintaining faithfulness to the original data. Importantly, rather than falling back on
fixed theoretical notions of anonymity, we allow participants on both sides to uncover the
best approaches in practice for launching or defending against privacy attacks. Ultimately,
we seek to advance generative techniques for dense, high-dimensional temporal data streams
that are (1) clinically meaningful in terms of fidelity and predictivity, as well as (2) capable
of minimizing privacy risks in terms of the concrete notion of patient re-identification.
Two-Sided Platform
Synthetic 
Data
Hiders Seekers
Generate
Attack 
Scores
Re-identify
Feedback Feedback
Head-to-head 
Matchups
Figure 1: Two-Tracked Competition. Head-to-head matchups between hiders (generating
data) and seekers (re-identifying patients) will be conducted through the two-sided platform.
(Not shown: Note that the synthetic data is separately evaluated on the hiders’ side for
faithfulness to the original data. See subsequent sections for scoring and ranking details.)
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1.2 Two-Track Format
This competition provides a two-sided platform for synthetic data generation and patient
re-identification methods to compete among and against each other. Our aim is to un-
derstand—through the practical task of membership inference attacks—the strengths and
weaknesses of machine learning techniques on both sides of the privacy battle, in particular to
organically uncover what existing (and potentially novel) notions of privacy and anonymity
end up being the most meaningful in practice. We therefore invite participants to compete
in either or both of two submission tracks of the interactive challenge: (1) the hider (i.e.
synthetic data generation) track, and (2) the seeker (i.e. patient re-identification) track.
Structure. Over the course of 3 months, models from both tracks will be pitted against
each other in head-to-head matchups to determine (1) which seekers can re-identify the most
patients, and (2) which hiders can best generate synthetic data resilient against privacy
attacks (while retaining the statistical properties of the original data streams). The evolving
marketplace of submissions on both sides will present live challenges: as more robust gener-
ative methods are submitted, re-identification methods will require ongoing adaptation to
remain competitive; likewise, as stronger re-identification methods are submitted, generative
methods will need to better protect against membership inference attacks. See Figure 1 for
a high-level overview, and Section 2.1 for a detailed discussion of the competition structure.
Evaluation. Each head-to-head matchup is a zero-sum game. Seekers will be scored accord-
ing to their accuracy on the membership inference task over each hider submission—that is,
in correctly identifying whether a given instance was employed in the process of generating
a given synthetic dataset. In the opposite direction, hiders will be scored according to how
well their generation algorithms hold up to membership inference attacks. In addition, hider
submissions are required to adequately capture the feature and temporal correlations in
the original data; accordingly, they must also first pass a minimum-quality bar (in terms
of fidelity and predictivity) in order to qualify for competition. (Although the trade-off
between quality and privacy is very interesting in its own right, for the purpose of fair
comparison we fix the former to allow ranking in terms of the latter.) See Section 2.2 and
Figure 2 for a detailed discussion and schematic of the evaluation and scoring procedure.
Dataset. This challenge will be held via clinical data from the intensive care unit (ICU).
ICU admissions represent some of the most data-dense patient episodes in healthcare, and
these patients represent some of the sickest. Unlike other healthcare domains, ICU data is
characterized by its granular, sequential nature, its high-dimensionality and variety of data
types, as well as heterogeneous sampling patterns and frequencies. This combination of chal-
lenges poses distinctive complexities for modeling; at the same time, it offers huge potential
for improving patient care in real-time settings of life-and-death decision-making—where
patients are often at risk of deterioration over the span of hours or minutes. Crucially, while
a range of diverse models have been investigated in medical literature (see e.g. reviews of
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Shillan et al. [2019], Fleuren et al. [2020]), they are largely based on a small number of
publicly available datasets. To date, the availability of alternative high-quality, dense, and
high-dimensional datasets for verifying model generalizability has been limited—precisely
due to concerns of privacy. See Section 1.3.3 for details of the new dataset we introduce.
1.3 Novelty and Impact
1.3.1 Healthcare Novelty and Impact
Success in this competition will make headway in bridging the gap between machine learning
and real-world healthcare applications. On the one hand, privacy is of paramount importance
if medical data is to be disseminated for public research. On the other hand, it is critical that
clinical applications be thoroughly tested in a wide variety of settings prior to deployment:
Generalizability is of particular concern, since remarkable variations exist across different
populations on the level of demographics, institutions, regions, and healthcare delivery
systems. Consider ICU data: Without doubt, several publicly available datasets such as the
Medical Information Mart for Intensive Care (MIMIC) (Johnson et al. [2016]) have been
instrumental in driving technical progress in statistical and machine learning applications.
However there are well-known differences in intensive care delivery models globally (for
instance, due to the greater availability of beds, US intensive care patients tend to have
far lower acuity than those in Europe). Models developed and tested on US data simply
do not generalize to European settings (see e.g. discussions in Desautels et al. [2017]). To
rigorously develop and validate models for generalizability, much more diverse datasets need
to be made available if healthcare is to safely benefit from advances in machine learning.
Privacy. The global legal framework protecting sensitive data (such as healthcare data) is
a hodge-podge of ideas. For example, the US Health Insurance Portability and Accountabil-
ity Act (HIPAA) and the corresponding European General Data Protection Regulations
(GDPR) impose differing—and often ambiguous—constraints to limit data sharing. Both
are deliberately vague in specifications of anonymity, relying only on intuitive notions of
“low probability of re-identification”. However neither “low probability” nor “re-identification”
are well defined concepts. In the case of the latter, the concept of “re-identification” ’ has
typically been interpreted through notions of k-anonymity (Sweeney [2002]), l-diversity
(Machanavajjhala et al. [2007]), τ -closeness (Li et al. [2007]), etc. As noted above, these only
aim to protect “sensitive” data elements from attacks on a small tuple of quasi-identifiers.
Novel methodologies are urgently needed to overcome current privacy concerns that prevent
valuable datasets from accelerating technical research to improve generalizability for real-
world clinical applications. Methods for generating high quality synthetic clinical time-series
data robust to privacy attacks have the potential to be game-changing in the clinical arena.
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1.3.2 Technical Novelty and Impact
The competition is challenging and highly relevant to multiple machine learning communities;
the “hide-and-seek” ’ setup easily allows enthusiasts to tackle two different sets of challenges:
Hider Challenge. In the “hider” challenge, a good generative model is needed for the
synthetic data generation task—one that accounts for the distributions and correlations
among and across both static and temporal features. Moreover, to be able to “hide” from
a “seeker”, various existing or novel concepts pertaining to anonymity and privacy may be
considered in terms of their practical effectiveness. Joining this track of the competition is
without doubt of interest to a large fraction of the machine learning community (e.g. any
student or enthusiast with working knowledge of GANs may readily attempt the task).
Seeker Challenge. In the “seeker” challenge, we offer a novel setup to experiment with
developing and performing attacks on machine learning models. The privacy attack is rooted
in real-world data privacy needs (esp. in healthcare), and has very different properties com-
pared with gradient-based adversarial attacks. Attacks can be either white-box or black-box.
This will raise new challenges to both the security and adversarial attack communities.
An Interdisciplinary Problem. Owing to the rich structure of the data, both sides of
the competition will benefit from research and methods inspired by self-supervised learning,
automatic machine learning, etc. for model design. In addition, there is an implicit require-
ment for higher-level notions of generalization as well: As the competition progresses, more
privacy attacking methods and more generative models will surface, and methods developed
by participants will need to generalize to an increasingly wide range of opponent models.
Related Competition. We are aware of the following related competition: NIST 2018
Differential Privacy Synthetic Data Challenge. This challenge tasked participants with creat-
ing new methods, or improving existing methods of data de-identification, while preserving
the dataset’s utility for analysis. Competitors participated in three marathon matches on
the Topcoder platform with the goal of designing, implementing, and proving that their
synthetic data generation algorithm satisfied differential privacy. All solutions were required
to satisfy the differential privacy guarantee, a provable guarantee of individual privacy.
Our competition differs significantly from this. Rather than requiring that a model satisfy
some provable theoretical notion of privacy (such as differential privacy), the privacy of
an algorithm will be defined in terms of its practical susceptibility to membership infer-
ence attacks on the platform. Our competition pits generators (‘hiders’) and re-identifiers
(‘seekers’) against each other. While provable notions of privacy might be used by teams
submitting to our generation track, the head-to-head format of our competition will en-
able practical evaluation of such notions, furthering the insights found in Bernau et al. [2019].
Methodological Challenges. In terms of time-series data generation, little work has been
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done in the realm of private generation of temporal data [Esteban et al., 2017]. However,
many private data generation methods focusing on static data have been proposed [Jordon
et al., 2019, Xie et al., 2018, Alzantot and Srivastava, 2019, Yoon et al., 2020]. The goal
of this competition is to bring focus to the more difficult task of temporal data, which is
clearly more rewarding and applicable to real-world applications, healthcare and otherwise.
1.3.3 Dataset Novelty
This challenge will use a new dataset. AmsterdamUMCdb was developed and released by
Amsterdam UMC in the Netherlands and the European Society of Intensive Care Medicine
(ESICM). It is the first freely accessible comprehensive and high resolution European
intensive care database. It is also first to have addressed compliance with General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR, EU 2016/679) using an extensive risk-based de-identification
approach. However, both ESICM and Amsterdam UMC aim to continuously evaluate and
if necessary improve privacy while maintaining usability.
AmsterdamUMCdb contains real data from critically ill patients from a mixed surgical-
medical tertiary referral centre for intensive care medicine with up to 32 intensive care beds
and up to 10 high dependency beds. It was released in early 2020 as comma separated
value files, with a total uncompressed size of approximately 78 GB. Access may be requested
through https://www.amsterdammedicaldatascience.nl and downloaded from https:
//doi.org/10.17026/dans-22u-f8vd. Detailed descriptions of the data schema and sample
code to interact with the data are available on the AmsterdamUMCdb GitHub repository
at https://github.com/AmsterdamUMC/AmsterdamUMCdb.
AmsterdamUMCdb contains approximately 1 billion clinical data points related to 23,106
admissions of 20,109 unique patients between 2003 and 2016. The released data points
include patient monitor and life support device data, laboratory measurements, clinical
observations and scores, medical procedures and tasks, medication, fluid balance, diagnosis
groups and clinical patient outcomes. Data granularity depends on the type of data and
admission year, but is up to 1 value every minute for data from patient monitor and life
support devices. The data is much richer and granular than those in other well known freely
available intensive care databases, such as MIMIC and is comprised of patients with higher
illness acuity than is found in US datasets.
2 Tasks and Evaluation
The following outlines the tasks and how they will be evaluated. Specific details of various
parameters (e.g. number of experiments per evaluation K, fidelity cutoff f) outlined here
will be released with the documentation in our starter kit.
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2.1 Challenge Tasks
The competition will be a continuous process taking place over 3 months, during which
participants are free to submit entries (i.e. algorithms) to either side of the competition.
A complete evaluation procedure of all submitted entries will be conducted on a monthly
basis, from which a leaderboard will be constructed for each track—respectively ranking
submissions in order of performance.
Task for Hiders
In the synthetic data generation track, participants are tasked with developing an algorithm
that generates synthetic data on the basis of real data. Their submission must be an
algorithmMG (i.e. not just a trained model), whose input will be random subsets of an
unseen subset of the dataset,
Dreal ⊂ D ,
and whose output is a synthetic dataset,
Dsyn =MG(Dreal) ,
that contains entries from the same space as entries in the original dataset. At competition
launch, participants will be given a subset of the dataset, Dpub ⊂ D. They will be free to
use this data to develop their algorithm and perform preliminary hyper-parameter selection
but may not use it to pre-train/initialise a model’s weights.
The synthetic data generated by each model will be evaluated in two ways: (1) similarity to
the real data; and (2) resistance to re-identification. For each model this will be done on K
random subsets of the non-public data, i.e. D1real, ...,DKreal ⊂ Dpriv = D \ Dpub.
Task for Seekers
In the patient re-identification track, participants are tasked with developing an algorithm
that performs membership inference (aka Patient Re-identification) on synthetic data
generation algorithms. Their submission must be an algorithm,MR (which may contain
trained models from the public data), whose input will be tuples of the form
(MG,Dsyn,Denlreal) (1)
whereMG is an indicator for the generation algorithm used, Dsyn is syntheic data generated
by MG and Denlreal is a random subset of D that contains the real data, Dreal, used to
generate Dsyn =MG(Dreal) (i.e. a randomly enlarged copy of Dreal). The output must be
a classification of each element of Denlreal, in which the goal is to classify the elements as:
‘in Dreal’ or ‘not in Dreal’
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or equivalently the output must be a subset Dpred ⊂ Denlreal corresponding to the elements
the algorithm classifies as being ‘in Dreal’.
At competition launch, participants will be given the same public dataset as the generation
track, Dpub ⊂ D. In addition, as each generation algorithm is submitted it will be made
publicly available alongside 10 synthetic datasets generated using 10 random (known) subsets
of the public data (so that re-identification track participants do not need to - but are still
welcome to - run the generation models themselves).
Re-identification algorithms will be evaluated on K synthetic datasets generated by each
generation algorithm according to their classification accuracy. The synthetic datasets used
for evaluation will be generated on the basis of random subsets of the unseen data, Dpriv.
2.2 Scoring and Ranking
Suppose we receive submissionsM1G, ...,MNGG to the generation track andM1R, ...,MNRR to
the re-identification track. Let Direal ⊂ Denlreal
i ⊂ Dpriv be K random subsets (and enlarged
subsets) of the private data. For each generation algorithm and each real dataset we generate
a synthetic dataset Di,jsyn =MjG(Direal).
Evaluating Seekers
For each i = 1, ...,K and j = 1, ..., NG, a re-identification algorithm, MkR, is assigned a
score Si,j,k ∈ [0, 1] according to its classification accuracy, given by:
Si,j,k = |D
i,j,k
pred ∩ Direal|+ |Di,j,kpred
c ∩ Direalc|
|Denlreal
i|
(2)
where c denotes the compliment of the set (withinDenlreal
i) andDi,j,kpred =MkR(MjG,Di,jsyn,Denlreal
i
).
To create an overall score for a re-identification algorithm, we will average the score of the
algorithm across the K synthetic datasets for each generation algorithm. The overall score,
SO, of re-identification algorithm,MkR, is given by
SkO =
1
K ×NG
NG∑
i=1
10∑
j=1
Si,j,k . (3)
Evaluating Hiders
Before being ranked according to robustness to re-identification, algorithms in the generation
track will be required to meet a minimum quality bar in order to qualify. Each of the K
synthetic datasets associated with each generation algorithm will be evaluated on their
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Figure 2: Schematics and descriptions for the mechanics of submissions and evaluations.
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(a) Participants and Submissions. Each
generation-track participant j ∈ {1, ..., NG} receives
an initial Dpub for algorithm development; they
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k ∈ {1, ..., NI} similarly receives the initial Dpub for
algorithm development, and moreover has access to
all M(j)G , j ∈ {1, ..., NG}; they each submit M(k)I .
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Submissions qualify if the degradation from TRTR
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the overall score for each j is given by Equation 7.
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(c) Inference Track Evaluation. We run
each inference algorithm M(k)I on the tuple
(M(j)G ,Denl,(i)real ,D(i,j)syn ), which outputs predictions
D(i,j,k)pred that aim to approximate D(i)real. The score
for each k is given by Equation 3.
D(i)real
<latexit sha1_base64="(null)">(null)</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="(null)">(null)</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="(null)">(null)</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="(null)">(null)</latexit>
Denl,(i)real
<latexit sha1_base64="(null)">(null)</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="(null)">(null)</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="(null)">(null)</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="(null)">(null)</latexit>
D(i,j)syn
<latexit sha1_base64="(null)">(null)</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="(null)">(null)</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="(null)">(null)</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="(null)">(null)</latexit>
D(i,j,k)pred
<latexit sha1_base64="(null)">(null)</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="(null)">(null)</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="(null)">(null)</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="(null)">(null)</latexit>
Generation Track
Inference Track
M(j)G
<latexit sha1_base64="(null)">(null)</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="(null)">(null)</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="(null)">(null)</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="(null)">(null)</latexit>
M(k)I
<latexit sha1_base64="(null)">(null)</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="(null)">(null)</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="(null)">(null)</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="(null)">(null)</latexit>
S(i,j,k)
<latexit sha1_base64="(null)">(null)</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="(null)">(null)</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="(null)">(null)</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="(null)">(null)</latexit>
F (i,j,l),P(i,j), C(i,j)
<latexit sha1_base64="(null)">(null)</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="(null)">(null)</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="(null)">(null)</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="(null)">(null)</latexit>
F, P,C
<latexit sha1_base64="(null)">(null)</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="(null)">(null)</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="(null)">(null)</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="(null)">(null)</latexit>
Dpub
<latexit sha1_base64="(null)">(null)</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="(null)">(null)</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="(null)">(null)</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="(null)">(null)</latexit>
(d) Complete Competition Setup. Blue lines
denote the tasks of participants in submitting algo-
rithms (blue boxes). Red lines denote the flow of
input and output datasets (red boxes) to and from
algorithms. Gray lines denote the computation of
performance scores (gray boxes). The orange box
denotes a collection of standard prediction tasks.
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similarity to the real data. We will measure the quality of each synthetic dataset by training
models on the synthetic data and then testing them on the real data. This will be compared
to the performance of the same algorithms trained and tested on the real data. For this
we consider 3 tasks that the synthetic data must be suitable for: (1) feature prediction, (2)
sequential prediction, and (3) time-series classification.
(1) For the first task we will randomly select Nf features. For each of these features,
we will train a predictive model, F i,j,l, l = 1, ..., Nf , on each synthetic dataset, Di,jsyn. To do
this, the remaining features (all but the one being predicted) will be used as input. The
predictive model’s performance (RMSE for continuous features, AUROC for binary, accuracy
for categorical), will be evaluated in the real data Direal, producing a feature prediction score
for each synthetic dataset, F i,j,l.
(2) For the second task, a 1-step-ahead prediction model, P i,j , will be trained using
each synthetic dataset, Di,jsyn. The prediction model will predict the feature values at time
step t+1 based on the entire history up to and including time step t. The prediction models
will be tested in the real data Direal that corresponds to the synthetic data, producing a
sequential prediction score for each synthetic dataset, P i,j .
(3) For the final task, the goal will be classification based on an input data-stream. A
classification model, Ci,j that predicts a label (such as mortality, respiratory failure, cardio-
vascular failure etc.) will be trained on each synthetic dataset, Di,jsyn, and then tested in the
real dataset, Direal, producing a classification score, Ci,j .
A score for each of these tasks will similarly be computed by training and testing within the
real datasets Direal, producing scores F i,l,P i, Ci, l = 1, ..., 10. A generation algorithm,MjG,
will qualify if and only if it satisfies all of the following for all i = 1, ...,K:
F i,j,l > fF i,l for all l = 1, ..., Nf (4)
P i,j > fP i (5)
Ci,j > fCi (6)
where f ∈ [0, 1] - i.e. the models trained on the synthetic data must achieve at least fraction
f of the performance of the models trained on the real data, for every task.
Models that qualify will then be ranked according to their robustness to re-identification
(the quality scores are no longer relevant once the bar has been passed). The re-identification
score, Rj , of generation algorithmMjG is given by
Rj = max
k
K∑
i=1
Si,j,k (7)
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where a lower score is better. This score corresponds to how well the best performing
re-identification algorithm (for the given generation model) is able to re-identify on average
across the different synthetic datasets generated byMG.
2.3 Baseline Algorithms
Hider Baselines
We will provide 2 baseline models for the synthetic data generation task: (1) a simple
noise-addition baseline; and (2) TimeGAN [Yoon et al., 2019]. The algorithms will be
made publicly available in the form of source code. These will primarily be of use to the
re-identification track as a starting point for developing their algorithms.
Seeker Baselines
We will have two model-agnostic baselines available at launch: (1) a simple nearest neighbour
method; (2) a classifier based method. Details of both will be given in our starter kit
documentation.
2.4 Tutorial and Documentation
We will use the TimeGAN baseline to provide an example submission to the generation track.
We will also provide an example submission to the re-identification track with placeholders
to be replaced by the user.
3 Organizational Aspects
3.1 Protocol
Submissions and Procedure
1. Generation Track : Each generation-track participant j ∈ {1, ..., NG} receives the
(same) initial set DG of samples for algorithm development; each submits an algorithm
MjG.
2. Inference Track : Each inference-track participant k ∈ {1, ..., NR} receives the (same)
DG, and also has access to algorithmsMjG, j ∈ {1, ..., NG}; each submits an algorithm
MkI .
3. Submissions Platform:
(a) We sample K random subsets Denlreal
i of records from the privately held dataset
Dpriv, i ∈ {1, ...,K}; for each subset, we further randomly sample 50% of these
records as Direal.
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(b) We train each generation algorithmMjG on Direal, outputting synthetic datasets
Di,jsyn.
(c) We run each inference algorithmMkI on (MjG,Di,jsyn,Denlreal
i
), outputting predic-
tions Dipred.
(d) We compute quality scores, F i,j,l,P i,j , Ci,j for i, l ∈ {1, ...,K}, j ∈ {1, ..., NG}.
(e) We compute scores Si,j,k for each combination of i ∈ {1, ...,K}, j ∈ {1, ..., NG},
and k ∈ {1, ..., NR}, using only the generation algorithms that exceed the required
quality scores. Using these scores we compute SkO for k ∈ {1, ..., NR} and
rank re-identification algorithms according to this. We also compute Rj for
j ∈ {1, ..., NG} and rank qualifying generation algorithms according to this. All
scores are shown to all participants.
CodaLab (https://competitions.codalab.org/competitions/) will be used to host the compe-
tition.
3.2 Rules
• ML-AIM lab, Microsoft Research Cambridge and Amsterdam UMC employees can
participate but are ineligible for prizes.
• Participants that have access to the AmsterdamUMCdb dataset will be required to
declare this and will be ineligible for prizes.
• Any participants that are ineligible for prizes will not contribute to the scores of other
teams.
• To be eligible for the final scoring, participants are required to release the code of
their submissions as open source.
• If a submission does not run successfully it is the participants’ responsibility to debug
it. Participants will be allowed to attempt to submit at most once per day.
• Generation algorithms may only use the public data to define and tune hyper-
parameters of their algorithm but may not use the public data to initialise/pre-train
a model. Winning algorithms will be closely inspected to ensure compliance before
prizes are awarded.
• Each generative algorithm will be required to run within a specific time on a given
GPU. Details will be provided in starter kit documentation.
• Each re-identification algorithm will be required to run within a specific time on a
given GPU. Details will be provided in starter kit documentation.
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3.3 Schedule
• May 11, 2020. Launch website with announcement and competition rules. Begin
advertising the competition.
• July 1 - October 1, 2020. Competition runs. Generation submissions will be
publicly available once submitted.
• October 1, 2020. Deadline for the final submission.
• October 1 - November 16, 2020. Organizers evaluate submissions.
• November 16, 2020. Announce competition results and release evaluation data.
Release code of all re-identification algorithms.
4 Resources
4.1 Organizing Team
Roles
James Jordon is an Engineering Science PhD student at the
University of Oxford. His primary research focus has been on
generative models and their use for various tasks such as synthetic
data generation, treatment-effect estimation and feature selection.
He has published papers in several leading machine learning
conferences including NeurIPS, ICML and ICLR.
•Lead Coordinator
•Competition Design
•Evaluation Design
•Advertisement
•Evaluator
•Baseline method
provider
Daniel Jarrett is a Mathematics PhD student at the University
of Cambridge. His primary research focus has been on represen-
tation learning for predictive, generative, and decision-making
problems over time with a focus on healthcare. He has published
in various journals and conferences including ICLR, NeurIPS,
AISTATS, and The British Journal of Radiology.
•Lead Coordinator
•Competition Design
•Evaluation Design
•Advertisemen
•Evaluator
•Platform Design
and Engineering
Jinsung Yoon is a PhD student in Electrical and Computer
Engineering Department at UCLA. His main research interest has
been on data imputation, model interpretation, transfer learning,
and synthetic data generation using adversarial learning and
reinforcement learning frameworks. He has published various
papers and served as a reviewer in top-tier machine learning
conferences (NeurIPS, ICML, ICLR, AAAI).
•Baseline method
provider
•Data analyzer
•Advise on
competition design
•Evaluator
•Advertisement
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Tavian Barnes is a masters student studying computer systems
in the David R. Cheriton School of Computer Science at the Uni-
versity of Waterloo. He previously worked at Microsoft Research
Montréal, primarily on NLP, dialogue systems, and reinforce-
ment learning. He also has experience running machine learning
competitions, having helped run the TextWorld competition for
the 2019 IEEE Conference on Games.
•Platform Design
and Engineering
•Evaluator
Paul Elbers, MD, PhD, EDIC is a medical specialist in intensive
care medicine at Amsterdam UMC, Amsterdam, The Nether-
lands. He also leads the Right Data Right Now research group
at Amsterdam UMC that specifically aims to bring machine
learning to the bedside of critically ill patients to improve their
outcome. He is the deputy chair of the Data Science Section of
the European Society of Intensive Care Medicine and co-chair of
Amsterdam Medical Data Science, home of AmsterdamUMCdb,
the first freely accessible European Intensive Care database.
•Domain expertise
•Data provider
•Advise on
competition design
•Advise on
evaluation design
Patrick Thoral, MD, EDIC works as an intensivist, medical
specialist for intensive care, at Amsterdam UMC, Amsterdam,
The Netherlands. With a background of medicine as well as med-
ical informatics, he’s currently responsible for implementation
of the electronic health record system in the ICU. To expedite
improving patient outcomes using health care data, he played
a major role in releasing AmsterdamUMCdb, the first freely
accessible European Intensive Care database.
•Domain expertise
•Data provider
•Advise on
competition design
•Advise on
evaluation design
Ari Ercole MD, PhD, FICM, FRCA, FCI is a research ac-
tive intensive care attending physician at Cambridge University
Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust with a PhD in physics and
extensive experience in computing and ICU data modelling. He
is chair of the European Society of Intensive Care Medicine
Data Science Section and is a founding Fellow of the Faculty of
Clinical Informatics. He has authored numerous peer-reviewed
publications on the re-use of routinely ICU time-series data to
improve predictions and care of intensive care patients and has
been involved in a number of big-data projects such as the de-
velopment of the Critical Care Health Informatics Collaborative
database Harris et al. [2018] and the recent DAQCORD data
curation guidelines Ercole et al. [2020].
•Domain Expertise
•Data provider
•Advise on
competition design
•Advise on
evaluation design
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Cheng Zhang, PhD is a senior researcher at Microsoft Research
Cambridge, UK. She leads the Data Efficient Decision Making
(Project Azua) team in Microsoft. Before joining Microsoft,
she was with the statistical machine learning group of Disney
Research Pittsburgh, located at Carnegie Mellon University.
She is interested in both machine learning theory, including
variational inference, deep generative models and sequential
decision making under uncertainty, as well as various machine
learning applications with social impact such as education and
healthcare. She has published many papers in top machine
learning venues including NeurIPS, ICML, ICLR, ICLR, UAI etc.
She co-organized the Symposium on Advances in Approximate
Bayesian Inference from 2017 to 2019.
•ML Expertise
•Advise on
competition design
•Advise on
evaluation design
•Advertisement
Danielle Belgrave, PhD is a principal researcher at Microsoft
Research Cambridge, working on the intersection of machine
learning and healthcare. The primary focus of her work is
on developing probabilistic models to understand personalised
healthcare strategies. She has published extensively on this
intersection in high impact medical journals. She is the tutorial
chair of NeurIPS 2019, 2020, diversity and inclusion chair of
AISTATS 2020, board member of the Deep Learning Indaba, co-
organiser of the first Khipu 2019, is a board member of Women
in Machine Learning, program chair of WiML 2017, and has
organised several other conferences and workshops.
•ML Expertise
•Advise on
competition design
•Advise on
evaluation design
•Advertisement
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Professor van der Schaar, PhD is John Humphrey Plum-
mer Professor of Machine Learning, Artificial Intelligence and
Medicine at the University of Cambridge, a Turing Faculty Fel-
low at The Alan Turing Institute in London, and Chancellor’s
Professor at UCLA. She is also the director of Cambridge Centre
of AI in Medicine. She was elected IEEE Fellow in 2009. She
has received numerous awards, including the Oon Prize on Pre-
ventative Medicine from the University of Cambridge (2018), an
NSF Career Award (2004), 3 IBM Faculty Awards, the IBM Ex-
ploratory Stream Analytics Innovation Award, the Philips Make
a Difference Award and several best paper awards, including the
IEEE Darlington Award. She holds 35 granted USA patents.
In 2019, she was identified by National Endowment for Science,
Technology and the Arts as the female researcher based in the
UK with the most publications in the field of AI.
•General coordination
and management
•ML Expertise
•Advise on
competition design
•Advise on
evaluation design
•Advertisement
4.2 Resources Provided
Microsoft will provide 2 $5, 000 cash prizes for the winning team from each track. In addition
to the cash prize, Microsoft have made available 50 grants of $250 Azure cloud computing
credits to students participating in the contest. Students are not required to use Azure to
compete.
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